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Abstract 
 
We study the adjustment process of a small open economy to a sudden worsening of external 
conditions. To model the sudden stop, we use a highly non-linear specification that captures 
credit constraints in a convenient way. The advantage of our approach is that the effects of 
the shock become highly conditional on the external debt position of the economy. We adopt 
a two-sector model with money-in-the-utility, which allows us to study sectoral asymmetries 
in the adjustment process, and also the role of currency mismatch. We calibrate the model to 
the behavior of the Hungarian economy in the 2000s and its crisis experience in 2008-11 in 
particular. We also calculate four counterfactuals: two with different exchange rate policies (a 
more flexible float and a perfect peg), and then these two policy regimes with smaller initial 
indebtedness. Overall, our model is able to fit movements of key aggregate and sectoral 
macroeconomic variables after the crisis by producing a large and protracted deleveraging 
process. It also offers a meaningful quantification of the policy tradeoff between facilitating 
the real adjustment by letting the currency depreciate and protecting consumption 
expenditures by limiting the adverse effect of exchange rate movements on household 
balance sheets. 
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Kamatfelár, hitelválság és mérlegalkalmazkodás  
egy kis, nyitott gazdaságban 
 
BENCZÚR PÉTER – KÓNYA ISTVÁN 
 
 
Összefoglaló 
 
E tanulmányban azt vizsgáljuk, hogy miként alkalmazkodik egy kis, nyitott gazdaság a külső 
finanszírozási feltételek hirtelen romlásához. A hitelválságot nem lineáris specifikációval 
modellezzük, amely kezelhető módon jeleníti meg a hitelezési korlátokat. Megközelítésünk 
előnye, hogy a sokk hatása erősen függ a gazdaság kezdeti eladósodottsági szintjétől. Az 
elemzéshez egy kétszektoros modellt használunk, kiegészítve a „pénz a 
hasznosságfüggvényben” feltevéssel. Ennek segítségével vizsgálni tudjuk az alkalmazkodási 
folyamatban megjelenő szektorális aszimmetriát, valamint a devizakitettség szerepét. A 
modellt a magyar gazdaság 2000-es évekbeli viselkedéséhez kalibráljuk, különös tekintettel a 
2008–2011-es válság alatti folyamatokra. A modell segítségével négy tényellenes szimulációt 
mutatunk be: kettőt különböző árfolyam-politikák mellett (rögzített, illetve szabadon lebegő 
árfolyam), majd ugyanezen rezsimeket kisebb kezdeti eladósodottság esetén. Összességében 
modellünk jól ragadja meg a fő makroökonómiai és szektorális folyamatok alakulását a válság 
során, ezeket egy jelentős és elhúzódó mérlegalkalmazkodás részeiként értelmezve. A modell 
alkalmas továbbá annak a gazdaságpolitikai dilemmának a számszerűsítésére, amelyben a 
reálgazdaság alkalmazkodását a hazai valuta leértékelődése ugyan segítené, de a háztartási 
mérlegekre gyakorolt hatásán keresztül negatív hatással lenne a fogyasztási kiadásokra. 
 
Tárgyszavak: kamatfelár, hitelválság, kis nyitott gazdaság 
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Abstract
We study the adjustment process of a small open economy to a sudden worsening of external
conditions. To model the sudden stop, we use a highly non-linear speciﬁcation that captures credit
constraints in a convenient way. The advantage of our approach is that the eﬀects of the shock
become highly conditional on the external debt position of the economy. We adopt a two-sector
model with money-in-the-utility, which allows us to study sectoral asymmetries in the adjustment
process, and also the role of currency mismatch. We calibrate the model to the behavior of the
Hungarian economy in the 2000s and its crisis experience in 2008-11 in particular. We also calculate
four counterfactuals: two with diﬀerent exchange rate policies (a more ﬂexible ﬂoat and a perfect
peg), and then these two policy regimes with smaller initial indebtedness. Overall, our model is
able to ﬁt movements of key aggregate and sectoral macroeconomic variables after the crisis by
producing a large and protracted deleveraging process. It also oﬀers a meaningful quantiﬁcation of
the policy tradeoﬀ between facilitating the real adjustment by letting the currency depreciate and
protecting consumption expenditures by limiting the adverse eﬀect of exchange rate movements on
household balance sheets.
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1 Introduction
The ”crisis of 2008” is the biggest and most widespread recession since the Great Depression. While
the crisis originated in the United States, it quickly spread to other advanced and emerging economies.
Although in the US the main problem was the near collapse of ﬁnancial intermediation, in many small
emerging economies the key feature of the recession was a sudden worsening of external credit condi-
tions. Taking such a shift in the external ﬁnancing premium as given, our goal is to study the quantitative
eﬀects of such an exogenous shock using a small open economy model.
Figure 1 plots the maximum increase in CDS spreads after the third quarter of 2008 against the net
foreign asset position for a set of Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries. The ﬁgure demonstrates
very clearly our primary motivation: the starting external position of these countries determined the
severity of the external premium shock during the ﬁnancial crisis.
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Figure 1: Initial debt and CDS increase in the crisis
Relative to the large literature on this topic, we adopt a novel speciﬁcation of the external ﬁnance
premium, which leads to a strong international transmission of shocks through ﬁnancial markets (like in
Devereux and Yetman, 2010), and resembles more complex frameworks of occasionally binding credit
constraints (like Mendoza, 2010) in three important aspects: (i) a near-constant interest rate when net
foreign assets are positive, (ii) a quickly rising premium for large debt holdings, and (iii) the (almost)
existence of an absolute borrowing constraint.1 This allows us to study the eﬀects of the crisis conditional
1These properties make it very similar to the penalty function approach of Judd (1998), advocated recently by De Wind
(2008) and Den Haan and Ocaktan (2009).
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on the external debt position of our model economy, in a tractable and parsimonious way.
We then link the impact of the external ﬁnancing shock to the exchange rate regime of the country.
Existing models (for example, Gertler, Gilchrist and Natalucci, 2007, or Faia, 2010) usually quantify the
welfare costs of the constraint that a pegged regimeputs on the response of an economy to such a shock:
on the one hand, ﬂexible exchange rates allow a quicker nominal adjustment in case of nominal frictions
(price or wage stickiness); and on the other hand, in order to defend the exchange rate, the central bank
has to raise interest rates, which -- through ﬁnancial frictions -- exacerbates the initial output loss. In
case of domestic (or a mix of domestic and foreign) shocks, however, Faia (2010) ﬁnds that a peg can
allow a softer reaction of the interest rate, hence a smaller output response.
We, on the other hand, want to explore the following advantage of a pegged (or managed ﬂoat)
regime in response to an increase in the external premium. Emerging economies, and countries in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe in particular, have built up signiﬁcant unhedged foreign currency liabilities before
the 2008 crisis (currency mismatch). Figure 2 shows that foreign currency lending was prevalent in at
least some countries in the CEE region, notably in Hungary and to a lesser extent in Poland. Not coinci-
dentally, and consistent with our modeling assumptions, more heavily indebted countries relied more
on foreign currency ﬁnancing (see also Figure 1).
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Figure 2: Foreign currency debt
A sudden tightening of external borrowing terms decreases the demand for local currency, putting
nominal exchange rates under pressure. Normally, such a depreciation facilitates the adjustment of the
economy, by allowing tradable prices and production costs (real wages) to fall. In contrast, under a
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currency mismatch, the resulting depreciation severely weakens the balance sheets (foreign currency
value of net wealth) of almost all economic actors (households, ﬁrms and the government) in such coun-
tries, amplifying the impact of the crisis. In the CEE region, central banks in mismatch countries were
indeed defending their exchange rates both by interest rate hikes and interventions, in order to limit the
deterioration of balance sheets (for Hungary, see Gereben, Karvalits and Kocsis, 2011).
To sum up, we seek answers to the following questions. Can we capture the large and persistent
impact of the crisis on small open economies with a single shock to foreign borrowing conditions? Are
there important asymmetries between the traded and the non-traded sector? How do the eﬀects de-
pend on the external debt position of this economy? Can and should the central bank alleviate the real
eﬀects by manipulating the nominal exchange rate? How does the policy response depend on currency
mismatch?
To answer these questions, we build a quantitative two-sector small open economy model with en-
dogenous currency mismatch through foreign currency borrowing and money in the utility. The role
of the latter is to provide a (reduced form) rational for households to hold domestic currency denomi-
nated assets. We assume that foreign borrowing has to be in foreign currency, and the interest rate is
dependent on the indebtedness of the economy. The main shock we are interested in is a permanent
tightening of external credit conditions, implemented as a rise in the foreign interest premium. Tech-
nically, we look at the long-run eﬀects of a permanent, unexpected shock (a transition from an initial
to a new steady state). An important methodological contribution of our paper is that by working in
a deterministic framework, we are able to solve the model nonlinearly. This allows us to use a highly
nonlinear and asymmetric speciﬁcation for the interest premium function.
As we already discussed, our motivation comes from the crisis experience of Hungary and other
countries in the Central and Eastern European (CEE) region. In order to match the initial developments
in these countries, we add a second, one period shock that captures the large drop in foreign demand.2
Since this shock lasts only for one period, it plays essentially no role in the persistence of the eﬀects of
the crisis in our model economy, which is solely explained by the permanent shock to foreign borrowing
conditions.
We describe themodel in detail later, but themain intuition is as follows. The increase in the interest
premiummakes households poorer, and its alsomakes foreign debtmore costly. Households respond by
2While this may ultimately be caused by the same world-wide tightening of credit conditions, in our small open economy
setting it is suﬃcient to implement it as a decline in foreign demand.
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paying back debt through reducing consumption, working more, and decreasing their money demand.
There is also an investment decline, due to higher borrowing costs. In response to the decrease in
export demand, employment in the export sector decreases, while households borrowmore to smooth
consumption and work less due to lower labor demand and hence lower wages. The initial net eﬀect
in the short run depends on the strength of these often opposing eﬀects, but after the ﬁrst period the
interest premium shock drives the economy.
Depending on the exchange rate regime, the money market clears in diﬀerent ways, which has im-
portant implications for the real economy. When the exchange rate is ﬂexible, it depreciates to match
the reduced demand for the ﬁxed nominal supply ofmoney. The lower exchange rate, in turn, stimulates
exports, and dampens the eﬀect of the export demand shock. Consumption falls, however, since the
lower exchange rate increases the indebtedness of the economy measured in foreign currency (trad-
ables).
When the exchange rate is ﬁxed, the export sector cannot take advantage of a weaker currency,
hence exports and employment fall more. This is particularly severe under downward nominal wage
rigidity, which we allow for. Households, on the other hand, can use their money holdings to pay back
foreign debt at the ﬁxed exchange rate, and hence their balance sheet remains in a better shape. This, in
turn, implies that consumption declines less than under a ﬂexible exchange rate. One of our main goals
is to quantitatively evaluate the links between export performance, consumption, currency mismatch,
and the exchange rate regime.
There are many other studies that employ quantitative small open economy models to understand
the eﬀects of various external shocks. Fernandez de Cordoba and Kehoe (2000), and Bems and Hartelius
(2006) use a two-sector real model to study the current account and real exchange rate implications of
trade and ﬁnancial opening. Rebelo and Végh (1995) and Burstein, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2007) add
a nominal side by introducingmoney. Apart from the diﬀerent question (Rebelo and Végh (1995) look at
exchange rate based stabilizations, while Burstein, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2007) study exchange rate
pass-through under large devaluations), our model diﬀers in several aspects. In our framework, money
does not have a direct role through a transaction technology, a feature both of their models exhibit.
Burstein, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2007) also assume price rigidity, while we have totally ﬂexible prices.
Even more importantly, our model has an external interest premium, so it can be used to analyze the
role of credit conditions. Finally, Cook and Devereux (2006), Gertler, Gilchrist and Natalucci (2007),
Brzoza-Brzezina and Makarski (2011) and Heer and Schubert (2012) all have ﬁnancing frictions and risk
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premium shocks, but they do not consider the implications of a currencymismatch in external positions.
Our model builds directly on Benczur and Konya (2013). In that paper, however, the main goal is to
understand the impact of the exchange rate regime on capital accumulation during convergence. Here,
on the other hand, we look at countries that experience external shocks and move from one steady
state to the next. We also modify the Benczur and Konya (2013) model in three aspects. (i) We add
a downward sloping export demand curve, which allows us to add an export demand shock. (ii) We
introduce a monetary policy rule that accommodates interim exchange rate regimes (“dirty ﬂoating”, as
opposed to a pure ﬂoat or a ﬁxed exchange rate regime). (iii) And ﬁnally, we assume that the external
premium depends on the net foreign asset position of households, instead of the consolidated position
of the country itself (which would also include central bank reserves).
This latter assumption is the main channel for the impact of currency mismatch. In Benczur and
Konya (2013), the mechanism is that the central bank earns a lower interest rate on reserves than what
households pay on foreign debt, hence holding the domestic currency asset (which has to be backed by
foreign exchange reserves) has a real eﬀect on the economy. In our current model, while a depreciation
in general leads to a capital loss of households, it also implies a nearly oﬀsetting capital gain at the central
bank. But due to our external premium speciﬁcation, even if this gain is redistributed to households,
there is still a worsening in the external premium, impacting the real economy. In other words, repaying
foreign currency debt from local currency assets is not neutral: although there is a corresponding decline
in central bank reserves, the external ﬁnancing premium still declines. Note that while wemake a strong
assumption, the mechanism operates as long as central bank reserves and foreign debt are not perfect
substitutes.
Once we described our model economy, we calibrate the model to ﬁt important aggregate and sec-
toral aspects of the Hungarian economy. Then we introduce the shocks of 2008 by an export demand
shock and a change in the parameters of the external premium function (a large decline in the neutral
level of the net foreign asset position), ﬁtting exchange rate, interest rate and tradable output changes.
Overall, we judge the model’s ability to ﬁt key macroeconomic variables to be very good: all variables
move in the expected direction, and the magnitudes are also reasonable. In particular, in response to
an initial increase of 485 basis points in the external premium, consumption expenditures fall by 17%,
investment falls by 46%, the nontraded-traded relative price falls by 19.5%, and they do not completely
recover for more than a decade. Though these numbers are larger than the initial drops we observed in
Hungary, the three-year cumulative impacts are quite similar.
6
Then we do four counterfactual experiments, which give us the following results. (i) Under more ex-
change rate ﬂexibility, our model is capable to generate both the advantages and the disadvantages of a
“competitive devaluation”. The export sector declines less on impact, and booms more after the export
demand shock passes, but household balance sheets suﬀer more, due to a large depreciation of the ex-
change rate and amassive capital loss on foreign loans. (ii) Fixing the exchange rate protects households
from the impact of the currency mismatch, but at the cost of a deeper drop in exports and employment
(mostly because the nominal wage cannot decrease enough due to downward nominal rigidity). Based
on this, we ﬁnd that letting the exchange rate ﬂoat more freely would have been undesirable for the
Hungarian economy. The tradeoﬀs between export performance and consumption expenditures called
for a muted exchange rate depreciation. (iii) Lower initial indebtedness allows the country to smooth
consumption more by borrowing from abroad, despite the increase in the interest premium. A less
indebted economy suﬀers less in the crisis, at least in terms of consumption decline. The relative per-
formance of the two exchange rate regimes also changes: we ﬁnd that increased exchange rate ﬂexibility
would have been beneﬁcial, had Hungary been less indebted in 2008.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the model. Section 3 presents our
quantitative exercise: model calibration, the impact of the crisis, and the three counterfactual scenarios.
Finally, Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
To understand the impact of the crisis, we build a two-sector small open economy model, based on
the approach in Benczur and Konya (2013). The economy produces non-tradables and exports, while
non-tradables and imports are used for consumption and investment. Households consume, invest
into physical capital, supply labor, and allocate their ﬁnancial assets between foreign bonds and do-
mestic money holdings. Households pay an interest premium on foreign bonds, which depends on the
indebtedness of the country as in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003), and hence taken as exogenous by
households. Money is valued because it enters directly into the utility function.
Our goal is to have a framework with currency mismatch, non-linearity in the ﬁnance premium, and
slow adjustment of real variables. As we show later, money-in-the-utility generates currency mismatch.
The deterministic framework and the particular speciﬁcation of the foreign interest premium allows
for highly non-linear eﬀects from foreign borrowing. Slow adjustment on the real side comes from
7
investment adjustment costs at the sectoral level.
2.1 Production
Final composite investment and consumption goods are assembled from imported (M) and non-tradable
(N) intermediate inputs. Export goods and non-tradables are produced domestically using capital and
labor. Note that, following Burstein, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2007), we assume that domestically pro-
duced tradables are exported (X), while tradables used in consumption and investment are imported.
Capital is speciﬁc to a sector, and investment is subject to adjustment costs (see below at the household
section). We use this assumption to prevent large reallocations across sectors; a similar assumption was
used in Bems and Hartelius (2006).
2.1.1 Final goods
Investment in sectors X and N and ﬁnal consumption are aggregates of imported and non-tradable
goods, and are assembled by competitive ﬁrms using Cobb-Douglas technologies. When describing
the production technology for investment, it is important to account for the quadratic adjustment costs.
Using Ij,t for investment in sector j net of adjustment costs and Ct for consumption, we can write the
production functions as follows:3
Ct = λ
−λ (1− λ)λ−1 (CMt )λ (CNt )1−λ(
1 +
φ
2
Ij,t
Kj,t−1
)
Ij,t = λ
−λI
I (1− λI)λI−1
(
IMj,t
)λI (
INj,t
)1−λI
,
where φ measures the extent of investment adjustment costs. Because we lack data on the tradable
intensity of investment at the sectoral level, we assume that this intensity is not sector speciﬁc (λI ).
Cost-minimization and free entry (zero proﬁts) can be used to calculate the demand functions for
the imported and non-tradable components of consumption and investment, and the price indexes for
the ﬁnal goods. We assume that only imported tradables are used in consumption and investment, as in
Burstein, Eichenbaumand Rebelo (2007). The law of one price holds for import goods, andwe normalize
the foreign importable price to unity, so thatPMt = St, whereSt is the nominal exchange rate. Demand
3Note that the subscript j indexes investment targeted towards the accumulation of capital in sector j = X,NT , while
the superscripts indicate the tradable (M) and non-tradable components of these investments.
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for imports and non-tradables in consumption and investment can be written as:
StC
M
t = λP
C
t Ct (1)
PNt C
N
t = (1− λ)PCt Ct (2)
StI
T
j,t = λIP
I
t
(
1 +
φ
2
Ij,t
Kj,t−1
)
Ij,t (3)
PNt I
N
j,t = (1− λI)P It
(
1 +
φ
2
Ij,t
Kj,t−1
)
Ij,t. (4)
The price indexes for consumption and investment are given by:
PCt = S
λ
t
(
PNt
)1−λ
P It = S
λI
t
(
PNt
)1−λI
.
2.1.2 Intermediate goods
Exports and non-tradables are produced using capital and labor. The production functions in both sec-
tors are Cobb-Douglas:
Y jt = K
αj
j,tN
1−αj
j,t , (5)
whereNj,t is labor employed in sector j, andKj,t is capital used in sector j.
Firms maximize proﬁts, subject to factor pricesWt and rkj,t (measured in domestic currency):
max
Kj,t,Nj,t
{
P jt K
αj
j,tN
1−αj
j,t − rkj,tKj,t −WtNj,t
}
.
The ﬁrst-order conditions of the problem are given by
rkj,t = P
j
t αj
(
Kj,t
Nj,t
)αj−1
(6)
Wt = P
j
t (1− αj)
(
Kj,t
Nj,t
)αj
. (7)
2.2 Households
There is a range of households with measure 1 in the economy. Households can hold three types of
assets: capital, interest bearing foreign bonds and non interest bearing domestic money. We assume
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that domesticmoney is not accepted by the rest of theworld. For accounting purposeswe also introduce
nominal bondsDt, which households use to acquire cash from the central bank. As in chapter 5 of Végh
(2013), and without loss of generality, we assume that they do not pay interest.4 These bonds may or
may not be accepted by the monetary authority, depending on the currency regime. Because they bear
no interest, households want to sell as much as the central bank is willing to accept. We relegate the
detailed description of monetary policy to a later section.
Households draw income from (i) supplying labor, (ii) renting out capital to ﬁrms, and (iii) holding
foreign bonds and domestic money. They allocate some of their income towards consumption and in-
vestment, and carry the remaining amount over to the next period in terms of ﬁnancial assets. Although
money does not pay interest, it is valued by households as it enters the utility function directly (money-
in-the-utility). It can also yield a ﬁnancial return in case of an exchange rate appreciation. Households
can freely adjust their portfolios between money and bonds within a period. In addition, households
accumulate capital for both the export and non-tradable sectors. As discussed above, investment is
subject to quadratic adjustment costs.
Households are monopolistic suppliers of diﬀerentiated labor servicesNi,t, as in Erceg, Henderson
and Levin (2000). Firms use a CES labor aggregate of individual varieties for production, subject to wages
set by households
Nt =
[ˆ 1
0
N
1− 1
σw
i,t di
] σw
σw−1
. (8)
We follow Fahr and Smets (2010) in their speciﬁcation of the wage adjustment function, which allows
us to incorporate downward nominal wage rigidity (DNWR) in the analysis. Changing wages is subject
to a utility cost Γ (Wi,t/Wi,t−1), where the adjustment cost function is highly asymmetric. We return
to the wage setting decision in the next section.
Household i thus solves the following problem:
max
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
logCi,t + γ log
Hi,t
Pt
− χN
1+ω
i,t
1 + ω
− Γ
(
Wi,t
Wi,t−1
)]
4Any interest revenue would be rebated to households by the central bank.
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s.t. St (Bi,t −Rt−1Bi,t−1) +Hi,t −Hi,t−1 −Di,t +Di,t−1 = Wi,tNi,t +
∑
j=X,T
rkj,tKij,t−1 − PtCi,t −
− P It
∑
j=X,N
(
1 +
φ
2
Iij,t
Kij,t−1
)
Iij,t + Ti,t
Kij,t = (1− δ)Kij,t−1 + Iij,t,
whereRt is the discount rate on foreign currency denominated bondsBit,Hit is the stock of domestic
money, andNit is the household’s labor supply.
After some simpliﬁcation, the ﬁrst-order conditions -- apart from the wage setting decision -- are
written as follows:
(Pt+1/St+1)Ci,t+1
(Pt/St)Ci,t
= βRt (9)
γ
Hi,t
=
1
PtCi,t
− β
Pt+1Ci,t+1
(10)
Qij,t = 1 + φ
Iij,t
Kij,t−1
(11)
Qij,t =
P It+1/St+1
P It /St
[
rkj,t+1
P It+1
+ (1− δ)Qij,t+1 + φ
2
(
Iij,t+1
Kij,t
)2] 1
Rt
(12)
Kij,t = (1− δ)Kij,t−1 + Iij,t. (13)
The ﬁrst equation is the consumption Euler equation, the second is money demand, the third is the
investment equation where qj,t is Tobin’s q, the fourth is the arbitrage condition between investment
and bonds, and the last is the capital accumulation equation (restated for convenience). Note that the
last three equations must hold separately for j = X,N .
2.2.1 Wage setting
Household i sets thewage rate for its specialized labor services subject to the usual CES demand function
from (8):
Ni,t =
W−σwi,t
W−σwt
Nt.
Using this demand function, and substituting in the ﬁrst-order condition for consumption, the wage
setting problem is given by the following:
max
∞∑
t=0
β
 1
Pt
ξi,tW
1−σw
i,t
Nt
W−σwt
− χ
(
W−σwi,t Nt/W
−σw
t
)1+ω
1 + ω
− Γ
(
Wi,t
Wi,t−1
)
,

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s.t. Γ
(
Wi,t
Wi,t−1
)
=
νw − 1
2
(
Wi,t
Wt−1
− 1
)2
+
exp [−ζ (Wi,t/Wi,t−1 − 1)] + ζ (Wi,t/Wi,t−1 − 1)− 1
ζ2
,
(14)
where ξit = 1/Ci,t is themarginal utility of consumption. The adjustment cost functionΓ takes the Linex
form used in Fahr and Smets (2010), and is capable of approximating DNWR to an arbitrary precision.
The Appendix plots Γ (·) with our parameterization that we discuss in the calibration section.
The ﬁrst-order conditions are given by the following equations:
Wi,t
Wi,t−1
Γ′
(
Wi,t
Wi,t−1
)
= (1− σw)Wi,t
Pt
Ni,tξi,t + χσwN
1+ϕ
i,t + β
Wi,t+1
Wi,t
Γ′
(
Wi,t+1
Wi,t
)
, (15)
where
Γ′
(
Wi,t
Wi,t−1
)
= (νw − 1)
(
Wi,t
Wi,t−1
− 1
)
+
1− exp
[
−ζ
(
Wi,t
Wi,t−1 − 1
)]
ζ
.
Because households are identical ex ante, they will all set the same wageWt. This implies that all other
decisions are completely symmetric as well, and aggregation across households is trivial. In what follows
we omit the subscript i, as all household variables will refer to aggregate measures.
2.3 The central bank
We follow Végh (2013) in our description of the central bank balance sheet and in the deﬁnitions of
a ﬂoating currency regime and a currency board. We assume that central bank assets include foreign
currency bct and domestic non-interest bearing bondsDt issued by households.
5 The per period budget
constraint of the central bank is then given by:
St
(
bct − bct−1
)
+Dt −Dt−1 + Tt = Ht −Ht−1.
The monetary policy regime is characterized by two parameters, ρs and ρh. First, we posit the fol-
lowing policy rule:
(
Ht
Ht−1
)ρs ( St
St−1
)1−ρs
= 1. (16)
5Central banks could and do hold interest bearing foreign assets. In the crisis period, however, interest earned on safe
foreign assets -- such as US or German government securities -- was essentially zero. We thus do not distinguish between
foreign cash and other securities, but our analysis can easily be extended to take into account a more general foreign reserve
composition.
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At one extreme (ρs = 0), the central bank follows a ﬁxed exchange rate rule and accommodates changes
in the money demand by changes in its foreign reserves. At the other extreme (ρs = 1), the money
supply is ﬁxed and the exchange rate is ﬂoating. Intermediate values of ρs indicate the extent of the
central bank’s desire to keep the exchange rate stable.
The central bank keeps foreign reserves to provide foreign currency liquidity when the currency does
not freely ﬂoat. The following equation describes the extent of foreign reserve holdings:
bct = ρh
Ht
St
. (17)
Under a pure ﬂoat, ρh = 0, while under a currency board, ρh = 1. In our baseline we track the actual
reserve to money developments in Hungary, including a signiﬁcant increase during the crisis. In coun-
terfactual experiments we choose reserve paths in line with the corresponding hypothetical exchange
rate regime. We discuss the precise choice of parameter values in section 3.1.
Note that the monetary authority manipulates the exchange rate through changes in reserves, or
in other words through its (partial) commitment to exchange foreign currency for domestic. Plugging
equation (17) into equation (16) for the cases where ρh > 0, we get:
Ht
Ht−1
=
(
bct
bct−1
)1−ρs
.
The equation highlights the extent to which increases in money demand lead to changes in foreign
reserves. When the exchange rate is ﬁxed, the money supply changes only through reserves. Under
a pure ﬂoat, the money supply is ﬁxed (we thus implicitly assume no helicopter drop money creation,
i.e. Dt = Dt−1 ).
2.4 Equilibrium
To ensure the existence of a well-deﬁned steady state in small open economymodels, the literature has
used various short-cuts, summarized in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003). These shortcuts essentially
amount to selecting a level for the steady state NFA and specifying a (reduced form) mechanism driving
the economy towards this long-run value. We follow the literature in allowing for a debt-dependent
interest rate, but we use a more general functional form that allows for asymmetry between debt and
assets, and a de facto upper limit to foreign borrowing. More precisely, we assume that the interest rate
13
on foreign currency bonds is given by:
logRt = − logβ + ν
e−ζ
(
bt/Yt−b¯/Y¯
)
− ζ (bt/Yt − b¯/Y¯ )− 1
ζ2
, (18)
where the last term is a modiﬁed Linex function (see Fahr and Smets, 2010 for details), and Yt =(
PXt /St
)
Y Xt +
(
PNt /St
)
Y Nt is GDP measured in foreign currency. Figure 3 shows the properties of
this speciﬁcation relative to the standard exponential function used by Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003).
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Figure 3: The linex function
The important feature of the Linex speciﬁcation is that it captures three key aspects of the interest
premium : (i) (almost) constant interest rate on assets, (iii) quickly rising premium for large debt, and
(iii) (almost) existence of an absolute borrowing constraint. Although (i) and (iii) do not hold exactly,
one can get arbitrarily close while preserving the smoothness of the premium function by increasing
the parameter ζ.
Note that the interest rate depends on foreign debt incurred by households.6 In particular, we do
not consolidate bt with central bank reserves bct . The assumption behind this is that reserves are only
used for liquidity provision, but not for bailing out households (or the government). Thus the riskiness of
6In our interpretation and calibration the household sector also includes public debt, and government consumption and
investment.
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the country -- measured by the interest premium -- does not depend on the amount of foreign reserves.
As noted before, the results would go through as long as debt and reserves are imperfect substitutes.
Now we specify market clearing conditions for non-tradables, exports and imports. Non-tradable
market clearing requires that production equals consumption plus investment:
KαNN,tN
1−αN
N,t = CN,t + I
N
X,t + I
N
N,t. (19)
We assume that exporters face a downward sloping demand curve:
Y Xt = A
(
PXt
St
)−η
, (20)
where demand depends on the foreign price of the good.
To derive the current account from the household budget constraint, we use the condition that
dt = Ht − Stbct = (1− ρh)Ht to get:
bt
Rt
− bt−1 + ρhHt −Ht−1
St
=
PXt
St
Y Xt − CT,t − iTT,t − iTN,t. (21)
Under pure ﬂoating (ρs = 1, ρh = 0), money does not enter the current account, and the model
is equivalent with a cashless economy (a “real model”) with money determined residually. Based on
Benczur and Konya (2013), it is easy to see that in this case the local currency interest rate is ﬁxed at
its steady state level.7 With a currency board (ρs = 0, ρh = 1), changes in money demand have to be
matched by equivalent changes in central bank reserves. Thus in order to increase (decrease) money
holdings, the country has to run a current account deﬁcit (surplus).
It is illuminating to write down the evolution of net foreign assets, which also includes central bank
reserves. To derive the general formula, letRct indicate the gross interest rate that reserves earn (in our
speciﬁc case Rct = 1, as discussed above). Moreover, let Bt = bt + b
c
t denote net foreign assets. Using
the household and central bank budget constraints, it is easy to show that the evolution of Bt is given
by:
Bt −Rt−1Bt−1 = TBt − ρh
(
Rt−1 −Rct−1
) Ht−1
St−1
,
7Let us deﬁne the local currency interest rate as Rdt = RtSt+1/St using the uncovered interest parity (UIP) condition.
Benczúr and Kónya (2011) show that under a ﬂexible exchange rate and a constant money supply, nominal spending PtCt is
constant. Combing this, the UIP equation and eq. (9) yields the desired result.
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where TBt is the trade balance denominated in foreign currency.
This equation makes it clear that currency mismatch operates through two channels in this frame-
work. First, as long as the central bank earns a lower interest rate on reserves than what households pay
on foreign debt, holding money (the domestic currency asset) has a real cost for the economy; more-
over, the crisis impacts the economy diﬀerently through this channel depending on the currency regime.
Second, if reserves (bct ) and non-reserve foreign debt (−bt) are not equivalent in their impact on the ex-
ternal interest premium, opposing changes in bct and bt -- which keepBt constant -- will still have a real
eﬀect through a change in the interest premium.
In our model both of these channels are operational, since we assume Rt > Rct = 1, and only
bt enters the interest premium function. When looking at the impact of the crisis from the angle of
currency mismatch, the second channel dominates. Defending the exchange rate allows households to
build downdomestic savings (Ht), and pay back foreign debt (bt). This leads to a decrease in central bank
reserves and hence there is no immediate improvement in the overall NFA position (Bt). Nevertheless,
the foreign interest premium declines, because private indebtedness falls. Allowing the exchange rate
to depreciate more, on the other hand, decreases the foreign currency value of domestic assets, and
hence makes households less able to draw on domestic savings to pay down their foreign debts.
To sum up, equations (1), (2), (3), (4), (6), (7), (9), (10), (11), (12), (13), (15), (16), (18), (19), (20)
and (21) jointly determine the endogenous variables. This is a system of nonlinear diﬀerence equations.
Since our model is deterministic, we can use DYNARE to get an arbitrarily precise solution without re-
sorting to log-linearization. This is important since our speciﬁed interest premium relationship is highly
nonlinear; one strength of our approach is that we can keep this nonlinearity in our solution method.
3 The experiment
Now we use our model to understand crucial aspects of the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008 in our small open
economy. As we discussed in the Introduction, the important aspects are (i) an external shock to the
interest premium, and (ii) a large temporary decline in export demand.
We set up the experiment to replicate important features of the Hungarian experience. As explained
earlier, wepresent simulations fromadeterministicmodel, where the economy is initially in steady state.
There are two shocks that unexpectedly hit the economy: a one-period drop in export demand, and a
permanent change in the amount of foreign indebtedness that markets are willing to tolerate. More
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precisely, we lower the parameter A in equation (20) for one period, and move the steady state NFA
per GDP level b¯/Y¯ to a higher (less negative) level. Thus we trace out the response of the economy as
it moves from the initial steady state to a new steady state with lower indebtedness.
The assumption that Hungary was in steady state before the crisis is of course questionable. Nev-
ertheless, we maintain this assumption partly for technical simplicity, and partly for the diﬃculties in
identifying factors that pushed the country away from steady state before the crisis. Regarding one ob-
vious candidate, the capital stock, Konya (2013) argues that a constant capital-output ratio is a good
description of the Hungarian experience between 1996-2009. In other words, Hungarian convergence
seems to have been characterized by TFP accumulation, and not capital deepening. At least in this sense
our initial steady state assumption is a reasonable one.
The one-period export demand shock is included to match the short-run response of the economy
better. Also, one can debate if the change in foreign debt tolerance is really permanent. We use this
assumption to substitute for an arbitrary end period, and because we do think the external adjustment
needed is here to stay for a long time.
3.1 Calibration
Figure 4 plots the 5-year CDS spreads for Hungary and the Czech Republic in the 2008-2011 period.
We pick the parameters of the interest premium function (18) based on this ﬁgure. In particular, we
use Hungarian and Czech CDS spreads before and after the crisis, along with the initial (adjusted) NFA
positions to pin down the linex parameters. Note that in our model it is the non-reserve part of the
total NFA that enters the interest premium function, so this is the data we use for the calculations. We
model the crisis as an exogenous shift in the long-run steady state NFA level, but we keep the two shape
parameters constant.
We have 4 parameters to calibrate: 2 shape parameters of the linex function, and 1+1 location pa-
rameters corresponding to the steady state NFA before and after the crisis. We proceed as follows. We
assume that the initial level of (nonreserve) NFA in Hungary corresponds to the pre-crisis steady state
(b¯0/y¯0 = −1.235), with a constant long-run premium included for both countries (120bp), which is the
Hungarian average CDS spread for October 2007 - September 2008 (the year before the crisis). We cal-
culate the maximum increase in CDS spreads for Hungary and the Czech Republic in Q4 2008, before the
endogenous response of the NFA levels. We thus have three observations: the increase in spreads in
the two countries (HUN: from 120bp to 605bp; CZE: from 35bp to 232bp), and the pre-crisis CDS spread
17
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three remaining parameters. Figure 5 illustrates the procedure and the actual calibrated Linex shapes.
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Figure 5: Calibration of the interest premium function
We normalize the export demand shift parameter in the steady state to A = 1. We then set the
one-period shock to∆A = −0.315, with which we match the decline in exports (relative to their 1995-
2008, pre-crisis trend). More precisely, since we are interested in the production side, we use domestic
tradable production, which is free from inventory dynamics. Note that the parameter change in itself
has no meaning, and its only function is to generate an endogenous decline in exports and employ-
18
ment. These, of course, also depend on the elasticity of export demand, and onmany other parameters
through general equilibrium eﬀects. In particular, the employment response crucially depends on the
interaction of exchange rate ﬂexibility and downward nominal wage rigidity. The elasticity of export
demand is set to a value that is in line with the estimate of Jakab and Világi (2008). The results are not
sensitive to moderate variations in this parameter.
To parametrize the wage adjustment function (14), we use the following considerations. First, we
set the symmetric cost parameter to νw = 1, which implies that wage increases are not costly. Second,
we pick the asymmetry parameter (ξw = 100) such that the adjustment function becomes very steep
just belowWt/Wt−1 = 0.95. We do this to take account of the fact that there is neither growth nor
inﬂation in our model. In Hungary, by contrast, the inﬂation target is 3% and we postulate that long-run
growth is 2%. Thus we shift the ﬂoor to wage adjustment by 5%, the hypothesized steady state growth
rate of Hungarian nominal wages. The resulting wage cost curve is shown on Figure 9 in the Appendix.
Our remaining parameter choices are summarized in Table 1. In particular, the discount factor is
calibrated to yield an annual real interest rate of 4%. The depreciation rate is a standard value in the
literature, and corresponds to a steady state investment ratio of about 0.25 in both sectors (inclusive
of adjustment costs). The shares of tradables in consumption and investment, and the sectoral capital
shares, come from Hungarian sectoral national accounts, where we classify sectors A, B C, H and J as
tradables (NACE Rev. 2), and the rest of the economy as non-tradables.
The labor supply elasticity is a fairly standard value in the macro literature. Capital adjustment costs
are based on Cummins, Hassett and Hubbard (1996) and Cummins, Hassett and Oliner (2006). These
papers imply a range of 2 − 7.5, of which we take a number close to the midpoint. Steady state labor
supply is calibrated to a 0.7 employment rate, with weekly hours of 40, relative to a total of 7 · 16. The
parameter onmoney-in-the-utility is calibrated tomatch the 2001-2008 average HungarianM2 per GDP
ratio (corresponding to the IT regime of the country before the crisis).
To describe monetary policy, we need to pin down the reserves to M2 ratio (ρh) before and after
the crisis, and the exchange rate ﬂexibility parameter ρs. Hungarian reserves increased substantially
during the crisis. We assume this increase was part of the observed policy mix, and model the change
as an AR(1) process: ρh (t) = ψρh (t− 1)+ (1− ψ) ρ¯h. We use Hungarian data between 2008-2012 to
roughly pin down the AR(1) parameter (ψ = 0.55) and the new steady state value ρ¯h = 0.7. Though this
value might have been reduced some years after the crisis, for simplicity we assume that the policy shift
was viewed as suﬃciently permanent by all relevant economic actors. The starting value is ρh (0) =
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Parameter Notation Value
Discount factor β 0.96
Depreciation δ 0.06
Tradables in C λ 0.315
Tradables in I λI 0.478
Capital share in T αT 0.427
Capital share in N αN 0.337
Labor supply elasticity 1/ω 1/3
Wage markup σwσw−1 1.4
Capital adjustment cost φ 5
Steady state labor N¯ (χ) 0.23 (150)
Steady state M2/Y H¯/Y¯ (γ) 0.48 (0.025)
Monetary policy ρs 0.133
Initial and ﬁnal reserve ratio ρh 0.452; 0.7
Reserve ratio shock AR coeﬃcient ψ 0.55
Export demand elasticity −η 0.5
Initial and ﬁnal (non-reserves) NFA position B0Y0 ;
B¯
Y¯
−1.238;−0.228
Interest premium function ν; ζ 0.0145; 2.095
Wage adjustment function νw; ξw 1; 100
Export demand shock ∆A −0.315
Table 1: Calibrated parameters and initial conditions
0.452. The exchange rate ﬂexibility parameter in the policy rule is chosen such that we replicate the
FT/EUR depreciation between 2008-2009. It is set to be ρs = 0.133.
3.2 Results
We plot the results of ﬁve simulations. First, we present the baseline case using the calibration we
discussed in the previous section. In particular, we set the initial level of non-reserves NFA per GDP to
-1.238, and the monetary policy parameters to ρs = 0.133 and ρh = 0.452. This, we believe, captures
key features of the Hungarian economy when it was hit by the dual shocks to the ﬁnancing premium
and export demand. As explained before, the crises also led to a gradual increase in the money to
reserves ratio (to 0.7). Our goal in the baseline scenario is to demonstrate that our calibrated model
provides a reasonable quantitative description of crisis events, in terms of the size, persistence and
sectoral asymmetries of the economy’s response.
In addition to the baseline, we explore four counterfactuals. First, we change monetary policy: we
explore the cases of a much higher degree of exchange rate ﬂexibility (ρs = 0.28, ρh = 0.452) and
a ﬁxed exchange rate (ρs = 0, ρh = 1). The ﬁrst scenario corresponds to a case when there is little
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monetary defense (the local currency nominal interest rate is raised much less),8 while the currency
board can also be interpreted as having already been in the Eurozone. Second, we evaluate the impact
of the crisis when the initial level of indebtedness is lower, with a starting value of non-reserves NFA
per GDP of−0.5875. This corresponds to the Czech value. It illustrates the counterfactual impact of the
crisis on Hungary, had it started from a less negative NFA position (smaller foreign indebtedness).
We are interested in the responses of consumption and employment under these alternative policy
arrangements. We expect that a ﬂexible exchange rate smoothes adjustment to the export demand
shock, and hence protects employment in the traded sector. This is especially important in the case
of downward nominal wage rigidity and a large shock (relative to the 5% steady state growth rate of
nominal wages we assume to be present in the data). On the other hand, because of currency mis-
match, a ﬁxed exchange rate protects the balance sheet of households (by allowing a reduction in the
risk premium through a decline in local currency assets and private sector foreign indebtedness). Our
goal is to quantitatively evaluate the strength of these two channels under alternative exchange rate
arrangements.
3.2.1 The baseline
Figure 6 shows selected variables under the baseline simulation. Our pre-crisis baseline year is 2008
(period zero), and we have data for 2009, 2010 and 2011 after the crisis hit. The stars represent changes
we see in the data, relative to their pre-crisis trends (if applicable). The appendix details their deﬁnition,
sources and the detrending method. Note that the perfect match of the exchange rate and export
changes in period 1 is due to our calibration strategy.
Figure 6 demonstrates that the model does a good job matching the impact of the crisis over the
ﬁrst three years, even though other shocks have surely buﬀeted the Hungarian economy since 2008.
The interest rate and exchange rate paths, which are not targeted by our calibration after the ﬁrst year,
are close to the data. The net foreign asset position worsens initially, then begins to improve. While the
current account is positive from the ﬁrst period (not shown), the 12% devaluation of the exchange rate
causes GDP measured in foreign currency to plunge. The NFA stock is denominated in foreign currency,
hence the large initial valuation eﬀect we see on the ﬁgure. Overall, the magnitude of the changes is
8Themain idea is to keep the pre-crisis ratio of reserves toM2 but allow formore exchange rate ﬂexibility. Amuch higher ρs
would produce excessive exchange rate depreciation, a huge initial drop in the NFA to GDP ratio, which in turn would prohibit
Dynare from being able to solve the nonlinear model. A “true” ﬂexible regime without less (or in particular: zero) reserves
would allow for a windfall NFA reduction through the sale of reserves, which we view as an irrelevant policy alternative.
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Figure 6: The crisis in Hungary: baseline simulation
quite close to what we observe in the data, although the model overpredicts the NFA change somewhat
for the ﬁrst year.
The initial money stock change in the data is much less than the model’s prediction, but over three
years the match is much closer. The same is true for the tradable-nontradable relative price. Nominal
rigidities in price setting and portfolio reallocation costs may be behind the slower initial response in the
data. The intuition the model captures is that households smooth consumption by using their saving
as a buﬀer. In the model, these are in the form of money. In our calibration, we used M2, so the data
points on Figure 6 also refer to M2, but there are probably other forms of domestic savings one could
take into account. Another possibility is that due to the crisis, households have an increased demand
for liquidity (or precautionary savings), which could be modelled as an increase in the parameter γ.
In terms of real variables, the model is quite successful in capturing both initial changes and further
dynamics. Two exceptions include: (i) the much smoother reaction of employment in the data,9 which
is nevertheless reasonably close to the simulated values after the ﬁrst period, and (ii) the much less
9Labor hoarding and government policies (like tax changes) could be partly behind the lack of a large employment drop. A
decline in capacity utilization could also be an explanation. There is indeed an approximately 15%drop in the Eurostat series for
Hungarian capacity utilization; which is large but still not suﬃcient to imply an unchanged employment level. From a growth
accounting perspective, we are left with an unexplained drop in TFP.
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pronounced recovery of exports in the data compared to the vigorous export growth predicted by the
model. Both issues deserve further investigation.
We experimented with two possible extensions of our baseline model.10 First, we added external
habit formation in consumption to the utility function, and changed the speciﬁcation of the capital ad-
justment cost to an investment adjustment cost. These modiﬁcations follow Christiano, Eichenbaum
and Evans (2005), and are included to slow down the adjustment of consumption and investment to
exogenous shocks. Indeed, with an extra parameter for consumption habits and the investment ad-
justment cost we can match the evolution of these two variables very well. The ﬁt for other variables,
however does not improve, and in some cases (the money stock and the relative price of imports) it
worsens somewhat. Since our primary interest is not to match the short-run dynamics of consumption
and investment, and the baseline does quite well over our three-year horizon, we decided against these
changes. Moreover, micro evidence for external habit formation and investment adjustment costs is
weak (Dynan, 2000 and Groth and Khan, 2010).
Second, we tried to capture the persistent decline in tradable productionwith changes in total factor
productivity (TFP). Since our baseline does quite well in matching investment and employment changes,
it is an accounting identity that measured TFP must have declined as well. Using sectoral national ac-
counts data from Eurostat, we ﬁnd that the Solow residual was roughly unchanged for nontradables,
but declined dramatically for tradables. Conditional on the short time series the latter change is at the
very least highly persistent, and possibly permanent, and even more so relative to the pre-crisis trend.
Surprisingly, incorporating this asymmetric TFP decline into the model does not improve the overall
ﬁt. While by design we do better with tradable production, the model does much worse in matching
consumption and investment changes. We conjecture that the Solow residual is likely to be a poor
proxy for true changes in productivity, due to changes in capacity utilization, market power, returns to
scale etc. We think that incorporating the many factors that potentially inﬂuence observed TFP would
unnecessarily complicate the model, which in its simpler form does quite well for most of our target
variables. Thus, while viewing it as an interesting research area, we do not pursue this direction further.
Overall, while not perfect, we judge themodel’s ability to ﬁt keymacroeconomic variables to be very
good. All variables move in the expected direction, and themagnitudes are also reasonable. Our results
are also comparable to those of Heer and Schubert (2012). Their permanent risk premium shock implies
a shift of 0.3 in the steady state NFA per GDP position, causing a 250 basis point jump in the interest
10Detailed results for the two extensions described below are available from the authors upon request.
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rate (on impact). In response, consumption drops by 7%, and the real exchange rate depreciates by 3%.
In our model, the impact of the pure risk premium shock is 300 basis point jump in the interest rate,11
leading to an 12.5% drop in consumption, and a roughly 6% real depreciation (10% change in the relative
price, and an approximately 60% non-traded share in expenditures).
3.2.2 Counterfactuals
Figure 7 presents the results from the ﬁrst set of counterfactual simulations. The solid lines are the
baseline described above, the lines with squares represent the ﬁxed exchange rate case, and the lines
with circles correspond to themore ﬂexible exchange rate case. Under higher ﬂexibility (ρs = 0.28, ρh =
0.452), the exchange rate depreciates bymore than 25% , and as a result, both the interest premium (not
shown) and the NFA per GDP positions worsen dramatically. Note that the local currency (HUF) interest
rate only increases slightly, due to the assumption on monetary policy.12 The consumption decline is
the largest under this scenario, especially from the second period onwards. Tradable production and
overall employment, on the other hand, decline the least. Thus our model is capable to generate both
the advantages and the disadvantages of a competitive depreciation. The export sector declines less
and booms more after the export demand shock passes, but household balance sheets suﬀer more.
Fixing the exchange rate protects households from the impact of the currency mismatch, but at the
cost of a deeper drop in exports. Consumption recovers the fastest under this regime, but the recession
-- in termsof employment -- is the deepest. We can also see that keeping the exchange rate ﬁxed requires
a substantial increase in the local currency interest rate (interestingly, our baseline increase was 300
basis points, which coincides with the actual interest rate hike in October 2008). Welfare implications
should be drawn cautiously, since employment in itself is actually undesirable in our representative
household framework. In a more realistic setup with heterogeneity, the employment decline may lead
to a steep income and consumption loss for particular households.
Overall, we conclude that given the high level of indebtedness and currency mismatch, letting the
exchange rate ﬂoat more freely would have been undesirable for the Hungarian economy. Defending
the export sector would have come at the cost of a much larger increase in the interest premium, in-
debtedness, and a much bigger drop in consumption.
11The shock itself is 485 basis points. After the endogenous response of all variables, the interest rate increases by 300 basis
points. The (adjusted) steady state NFA per GDP position shifts by 1.01.
12This exercise shows that there is a close mapping between our formulation of monetary policy (exchange rate smoothing)
and a monetary reaction function responding to changes in the foreign currency premium.
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Figure 7: The eﬀects of the crisis: counterfactuals
In our ﬁnal exercise we repeat the policy comparison between a ﬁxed and a relatively ﬂexible ex-
change rate regime, but assuming a lower level of initial indebtedness. We keep the policy parameters
as in the previous experiment, but change the initial level of the non-reserveNFA toGDP ratio to -0.5875.
This was the value for the Czech Republic in 2008. Note, however, that we do not do a full recalibration,
and continue using Hungarian values for the rest of the parameters. The exercise should be interpreted
as a “what if”: what would have been the better policy choice for Hungary in 2008, had its initial level
of non-reserve NFA been at the Czech level.
Figure 8 presents the results. In general, since the shock is smaller in this case (see also Figure 5), the
responses of the endogenous variables are also more muted. Focusing on employment and consump-
tion, however, the policy message is clear. The tradeoﬀ highlighted in the previous experiment disap-
pears. With a lower level of indebtedness, more exchange rate ﬂexibility would have been desirable. In
particular, consumption now drops less in the more ﬂexible case. The exchange rate depreciation helps
with external adjustment, so households can draw down their domestic assets to smooth consumption.
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Figure 8: Policy comparison with lower initial indebtedness
4 Conclusion
We presented a simple two-sector small open economy model with a meaningful nominal and external
ﬁnancing side, which we utilized to study the adjustment process of a small open economy to a sudden
worsening of external conditions. By adopting a highly non-linear speciﬁcation of the endogenous ex-
ternal ﬁnance premium, we can add credit constraints into a small open economy model in a plausible,
quantitatively relevant yet tractable way. This is made possible by the fact that we work in a determin-
istic framework, and hence we are able to solve the model nonlinearly, even for a highly nonlinear and
asymmetric speciﬁcation for the interest premium function.
We calibrate the model to the performance of the Hungarian economy in the 2000s and its 2008 cri-
sis experience in particular. The main shock we are interested in is a permanent tightening of external
credit conditions, implemented as a rise in the foreign interest premium. In order to match the initial
developments in these countries, we add a second, one period shock that captures the large drop in
foreign demand. Then we also compute four counterfactuals: with two diﬀerent exchange rate policies
(more ﬂexible and a perfect peg), both under the original and a lower level of initial external indebted-
ness.
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Overall, we judge the model’s ability to ﬁt key macroeconomic variables to be very good: all vari-
ables move in the expected direction, and the magnitudes are reasonable. Our model also generates a
quantitatively meaningful tradeoﬀ between letting the currency depreciate and allowing for a quicker
real adjustment of the economy, versus protecting consumption expenditures by limiting exchange rate
movements and saving household balance sheets.
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Appendix
Figure 9: Wage adjustment cost
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series name deﬁnition source adjustment
Interest rate CDS spread plus benchmark rate Bloomberg Q3 to Q3
Exchange rate Annual average MNB Q3 to Q3
NFA per GDP NFA minus reserves, over GDP (all in
HUF)
MNB (both NFA and
reserves); Eurostat (GDP)
None
Money stock M2, nominal MNB Rel. to the 1995-2008 trend
NT-T relative price Market services to manufacturing MNB Rel. to the 1995-2008 trend
Tradable production Gross value added, chain-linked
volumes, NACE Rev. 2. sectors A-C, H, J
Eurostat Rel. to the 1995-2008 trend
Consumption Sum of private and government
consumption, chain-linked volumes
Eurostat Rel. to the 1995-2008 trend
Investment Gross ﬁxed capital formation,
chain-linked volumes
Eurostat Rel. to the 1995-2008 trend
Employment Empl. in resident production units Eurostat Rel. to the 1995-2008 trend
Notes. (1) We assume that without the crisis, the last six variables in Table 2 would have continued their pre-crisis
trends; while the ﬁrst three (interest rate, exchange rate and NFA per GDP) would have remained constant.
(2) The crisis hit right after the end of the third quarter in 2008. Since the interest rate and the exchange rate
adjusted immediately, we took their pre-crisis values as corresponding to Q3 of 2008, and all the consecutive
years as Q3-to-Q3. For the other variables, adjustment is more gradual, hence this is not a major issue.
Table 2: Data used in Figure 6
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